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Happiness and Punishment 
 
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur† 
 
 
Now as for the future of reflection about punishment: First, I 
think we can look forward to continued valuable illumination 
from the social-science disciplines . . . .1 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When the state punishes a criminal, it purposely inflicts 
suffering on one of its citizens.  If that act is to be justified, limits must 
be set on the amount and type of suffering that may be imposed.  A 
justification therefore requires an understanding of the ways in which 
punishment actually inflicts suffering on those punished.  How and to 
what extent do fines and incarceration negatively affect happiness or 
well-being?  The answers might seem obvious, but as we have 
indicated in the context of civil settlement,2 recent empirical work in 
behavioral psychology suggests otherwise. 
 This empirical work reveals that people adapt to monetary 
fines far better than they expect.  Paying a fine initially decreases an 
offender’s level of happiness, but that level rebounds quickly toward 
its initial state.  Even large fines have only minor effects on the well-
being of those who receive them, because people adjust quite easily to 
their new financial circumstances.  Adaptation thus reduces heavily 
the punitive consequence of a fine.  
 Prison has a more complicated effect on happiness.  On the one 
hand, it is similar to a fine in that people adapt well to being in prison.  
Their happiness drops at the beginning and they expect it to remain 
low, but it rebounds impressively as they adjust to their new 
surroundings.  On the other hand, virtually any period of incarceration, 
no matter how brief, has consequences that negatively affect prisoners’ 
                                                          
† Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Visiting 
Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law; and Assistant Professor, 
University of Chicago Law School, respectively.  
1 Herbert Morris, Concluding Remarks: The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1927, 1930 (1999). 
2 John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Hedonic 
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV.  (forthcoming 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098271. 
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lives in ways that resist adaptation, even after they have been released.  
Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, face 
difficulty finding and keeping employment, and must grapple with 
incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration.  Thus, living 
in prison itself becomes less oppressive with time, but the effects of 
having been in prison tend to linger and to diminish happiness 
indefinitely. 
 These results differ dramatically from the standard 
assumptions that underlie both penal policy and philosophical 
scholarship on punishment.  All major accounts of punishment place a 
high value on proportionality: more serious crimes warrant more 
severe punishment, either to effect greater deterrence, to repay the 
offender adequately for her misdeeds, to express the appropriate level 
of societal condemnation, or some combination thereof.  But owing to 
the ways in which people do and do not adapt to various hardships, our 
current methods of punishment are too blunt for proportional 
punishments to be fashioned. 
 Contrary to expectations, adjusting the size of a fine or the 
length of a prison sentence does not meaningfully adjust the amount of 
unhappiness that is ultimately experienced by the offender.  Paying 
more money or staying in prison for a longer period are highly 
susceptible to adaptation.  As a result, virtually any fine imposes only 
fleeting harm.  On the other hand, virtually any term of imprisonment 
imposes large and lasting harm by causing disease, unemployment, 
and loss of social connection; but longer prison terms do not diminish 
happiness much more than do shorter ones.  It is therefore impossible 
to tailor a punishment to fit the severity of a crime, given the penal 
options available. 
 In addition to depriving punishment of its proportionality, 
adaptation has other significant effects.  It diminishes the harm 
imposed by a monetary fine without diminishing the fine’s capacity to 
deter, because would-be offenders will mistakenly expect a large fine 
to decrease their happiness substantially.  Adaptation to the actual time 
spent in prison works similarly, but that phenomenon works at cross-
purposes with the fact that post-prison life is worse than has been 
assumed by most theorists and legislators.  In designing a system of 
punishment, scholars and policymakers must account for the 
ramifications of hedonic adaptation in order for their penal regimes to 
reflect the actual experience of punishment.  This necessity holds for 
retributive and utilitarian theorists alike. 
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 Our aim in this article is to use recent psychological findings to 
describe more accurately the effects of punishment.  In Part I, we 
analyze the findings themselves and the studies that give rise to them.  
In Part II, we apply the findings to the utilitarian theory of punishment, 
and in Part III we apply them to retributive and mixed theories of 
punishment.  We assess the import of the findings for each theory and 
the new challenges they pose for criminal justice. 
 
I.  THE HEDONIC CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT 
 
All leading theories of criminal punishment must be concerned 
with the way punishment is subjectively experienced by the offender.3  
Until recently, however, little was known about how people responded 
to the various punishments inflicted on them.  Over the past couple of 
decades, and especially in the last few years, an interdisciplinary group 
of social scientists has begun to develop techniques for accurately 
measuring the subjective pain—physical and psychological—that 
punishment inflicts.   
 This research on the subjective experience of punishment is 
part of a larger body of social science research devoted to the 
measurement and determinants of subjective well-being.4  Motivated 
by the belief that individual self-reports provide the best metrics of 
well-being, hedonic psychology (or simply hedonics) has emerged as 
one of the most vibrant fields in the behavioral sciences.5  Among its 
most robust and consistent findings are two that are highly relevant to 
the study of punishment:  1) most life events, whether positive or 
negative, exert little lasting effect on an individual’s well-being 
because people adapt rapidly to them; and 2) people do not recognize 
or remember how quickly they adapt and thus make very poor 
                                                          
3 See Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, COLUM. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090337.  Kolber writes, 
“[A] successful theory of punishment must take account of offenders’ subjective 
experiences when assessing punishment severity.”  Id. at 5. 
4 See Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY ix (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1999). 
5 Hedonic psychology has also had a substantial impact on American popular 
culture through works like Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink, Daniel Gilbert’s Stumbling on 
Happiness, and Jonathan Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis. 
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estimates about the hedonic impact of future events.6  Studies have 
shown that, after immediate, short-term changes, people rapidly return 
to prior levels of well-being following experiences ranging from 
learning that they scored poorly on a personality test7 to becoming 
paraplegic.8 
 This Part explores evidence for hedonic adaptation to the two 
principal forms of punishment used in the United States, monetary 
fines and imprisonment.9  Recent social scientific studies support the 
notion that criminals adapt extremely rapidly to these punishments, 
and that increasing their magnitude, through larger fines or longer 
prison terms, will have little effect on the punishments’ overall 
hedonic impact.  Yet while offenders are likely to adapt quickly to 
paying fines and spending time in prison, other research has shown 
that incarceration substantially affects ex-inmates for many years 
following prison.  People who have spent any time in prison are 
significantly more likely to experience chronic, stress-related health 
impairments, unemployment, and the breakdown of psychologically 
vital social ties.  Unlike fines and imprisonment itself, these post-
prison consequences of incarceration are likely to generate substantial 
and long-lasting hedonic penalties for ex-inmates regardless of the 
lengths of their sentences. 
 
A.  Hedonic Adaptation and Affective Forecasting 
 
 In a now-classic study published in 1978, Philip Brickman and 
his colleagues compared recent lottery winners and recently paralyzed 
                                                          
6 Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective 
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821 (2000) (hereinafter 
Focalism). 
7 Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in 
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998) (hereinafter 
Immune Neglect). 
8 C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional 
Status, 16 SPINE 78 (1991). 
9 Although we focus on fines and imprisonment, our arguments are certainly 
relevant to debates about less traditional forms of punishment, including shaming.  
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 593 (1996).  For brevity’s sake, we also do not discuss certain punishments that 
are traditionally viewed as lighter than fines, such as probation and community 
service.  See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND 
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 6-7 
(1990). 
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paraplegics and quadriplegics with control groups.  The lottery 
winners were not much happier than the controls, and the accident 
victims were considerably happier than anticipated, reporting levels of 
well-being above the scale’s midpoint.10  According to Brickman, 
these results indicated that people experience life as if on a “hedonic 
treadmill” such that positive and negative life events create only 
temporary departures from an established well-being set point.11  This 
theory has been enormously influential in the social sciences, 
particularly as it has challenged the traditional economic 
understanding of utility.12  Moreover, it has motivated innumerable 
studies exploring the hedonic consequences of a large variety of 
events.13 
 These studies, whether of responses to income gains,14 tenure 
denial,15 or disability,16 often report similar findings:  “most people are 
reasonably happy most of the time, and most events do little to change 
that for long.”17  The many studies examining people’s experiences 
with disability provide the most compelling evidence.18  For example, 
people with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being similar to 
those of healthy controls,19 as do burn victims,20 patients with 
colostomies21 and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney 
                                                          
10 See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is 
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920-21 (1978). 
11 See Philip Brickman & Donald Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning 
the Good Society, in ADAPTATION LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M.H. Appley 
ed. 1971). 
12 See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at 
13-15. 
13 For an early review, see Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic 
Adaptation, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at 312. 
14 See Richard Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 11,176, 11,178 (2003). 
15 See Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 622-23. 
16 See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt?  A 
Longitudinal Study of Disability With Implications for Economists and Judges, J. 
PUB. ECON. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921040. 
17  Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 618. 
18 For a review of these studies and their implications for legal settlement, see 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 2, at 4-12. 
19  See Lundqvist et al., supra note 8, at 80. 
20 David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 362, 362 (1993). 
21 Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED. 
DECISION MAKING 58, 66 (1990). 
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disorders.22  In the most recent longitudinal study of adaptation, 
economists tracked the subjective well-being ratings of people who 
subsequently became disabled and remained so.  They found that in 
only two years, subjects had substantially adapted to their injuries.23  
Although the psychological mechanisms underlying hedonic 
adaptation remain poorly understood, it seems as if people have a 
“psychological immune system” that helps them cope with the effects 
of many kinds of events.24 
 While adaptation seems pervasive, further research has 
demonstrated its limits.25  Thus, people are less likely to adapt to some 
health-related stimuli like noise,26 chronic headaches,27 and certain 
degenerative diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis,28 multiple 
                                                          
22 See Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A 
Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3, 
6 (2005). 
        23 See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 16, at 13-14.  As a group, people who 
became disabled reported an average well-being score of 4.8 for the two years 
preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7 at the onset of disability, and then a 
subsequent rebound to 4.1 in the next two years despite the fact that the disabilities 
themselves had not changed.  Separating the moderately and severely disabled 
groups, the authors find approximately 50% adaptation to moderate disability and 
30% adaptation to severe disability.  Thus, there is substantial evidence that hedonic 
adaptation to disability is significant (if incomplete).  Id. 
24 Gilbert, et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 619.  They write, “Ego 
defense, rationalization, dissonance reduction, motivated reasoning, positive 
illusions, self-serving attribution, and self-justification are just some of the terms that 
psychologists have used to describe the various strategies, mechanisms, tactics, and 
maneuvers of the psychological immune system.”  Id.  Similarly, Daniel Kahneman 
and Richard Thaler note that attention is normally directed towards novelty, 
including changes in response to disability.  Therefore, “as the new state loses its 
novelty it ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention, and other aspects of life again 
evoke their varying hedonic responses.”  Daniel Kahneman & Richard Thaler, Utility 
Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 230 (2006). 
These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive, allowing people to recover 
quickly from considerable misfortune. 
25 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 312. 
26 See Neil. D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against 
Adaptation, 2 J. ENVIR. PSYCHOL. 87, 87 (1992). 
27 See Victoria Guitera et al., Quality of Life in Chronic Daily Headache, 58 
NEUROLOGY 1062 (2002). 
28 See C.A. Smith & K.A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic 
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 151, 
151 (1992). 
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schlerosis,29 HIV/AIDS,30 and hepatitis C infection.31  Additionally, 
socially relevant stimuli such as divorce,32 the death of a spouse,33 and 
unemployment34 prove incredibly difficult to adapt to, with hedonic 
penalties lasting even after remarriage or reemployment.   
 Although adaptation’s effects are substantial, they are hardly 
ever recognized or remembered.  Research on affective forecasting – 
the ability to predict how future events will make you feel – has 
repeatedly shown that people suffer from both impact and duration 
biases causing them to overestimate the size and the length of hedonic 
experiences.35  For example, people generally predict that becoming 
disabled will have an enormous and long-lasting impact on their 
happiness, despite the fact that most people adapt rapidly to 
disability.36  According to Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, people 
suffer from focusing illusions caused by paying too much attention to 
the few changes wrought by new events while ignoring the many 
things that remain the same.37 
                                                          
29 See R.F. Antonak & H. Livneh, Psychosocial Adaption to Disability and Its 
Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis, 40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1099, 
1103 (1995) (reporting that people suffering from MS report higher levels of 
depression than healthy people). 
30 See Ron D. Hays et al., Health-related Quality of Life in Patients with Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: Results from the HIV Cost 
and Services Utilization Study, 108 AM. J. OF MED. 714 (2000). 
31 See Judith I. Tsui et al., The Impact of Chronic Hepatitis C on Health-Related 
Quality of Life in Homeless and Marginally Housed Individuals with HIV, 11 AIDS 
BEHAV. 603 (2007). 
32 See Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model 
of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 527 (2003). 
33 Id. 
34 See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot? 
Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 89 
(P.A. David & M.W. Reder, eds. 1974). 
35 See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing 
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005). 
36 See Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be 
Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005) (“One of the most commonly 
replicated ‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of 
people with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their quality of 
life would be if they had those conditions . . . .”). 
37 See Wilson et al., Focalism, supra note 6, at 822; Daniel T. Gilbert & 
Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 SCIENCE 1351 
(2007). 
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 Significantly for our interests, these findings apply not just to 
rare occurrences such as becoming disabled but also to more regularly 
recurring events like being dumped by a boy/girlfriend, seeing your 
favorite football team lose, and being passed over for a job.38  
Learning from past hedonic experiences is rare, because the process of 
doing so is complex.39  It requires that people recognize that they have 
experienced a similar event in the past, make an effort to remember 
how that event made them feel, and accurately recall their reaction.40  
The last of these is a particularly steep burden.41  Thus, even people 
with substantial previous experience with a stimulus are unlikely to 
remember that its hedonic impact was both weaker and shorter than 
predicted. 
 
 B.  Adaptation to Economic Loss 
 
 Perhaps hedonic psychology’s only finding more important—
and more counterintuitive—than adaptation to disability is its 
consistent evidence of money’s limited hedonic impact.  Since the 
economist Richard Easterlin first proposed his “paradox” about the 
lack of correlation between income and happiness, numerous studies 
have supported the idea that, except below the level of subsistence, 
increased income produces very limited gains in subjective well-
being.42  A variety of explanations for this phenomenon have emerged, 
ranging from constantly rising aspiration levels43 to altered social 
comparisons,44 but the message is clear: money can’t buy happiness. 
                                                          
38 See Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7. 
39 See Peter Ayton et al., Affective Forecasting: Why Can’t People Predict Their 
Emotions?, 13 THINKING & REASONING 62 (2007). 
40 Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 649, 652 (2006). 
41 See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Lessons From the Past: Do People Learn from 
Experience That Emotional Reactions are Short-Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648, 1649 (2001).  According to Christianson and Safer, “There 
are apparently no published studies in which a group of subjects has accurately 
recalled the intensity and/or frequency of their previously recorded emotions.”  
Quoted in id. 
42 For a review of the extensive literature, see Ed Diener & Robert Biswas-
Diener, Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being: A Literature Review and Guide 
to Needed Research, 57 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 119 (2002). 
43 See Easterlin, supra note 14, at 11,178. 
44 See Diener & Diener, supra note 42, at 147. 
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 But can losing money make you less happy?  There is less 
research on the hedonic impact of economic losses, but what does 
exist suggests that people adapt to losses much as they do gains.45  In 
one study, subjects who lost a $3 gamble had returned very close to 
pre-gamble happiness levels in only 10 minutes.46  Although these 
amounts and time periods are rather small, the authors extrapolate to 
more substantial sums:  “even though losing $7,500 does have a larger 
hedonic impact than winning $10,000, it probably does not have as 
great an impact as people expect.”47  More significantly, Ed Diener 
and colleagues tracked people who lost at least half a standard 
deviation of their annual income in a longitudinal study over a period 
of nine years.48  Not only were these people not unhappier than those 
whose incomes didn’t change or whose incomes increased, they were 
actually happier.49 
 As we will explore later, studies such as these call into 
question traditional rationales for the imposition of monetary penalties 
on criminal offenders.  Although such penalties will likely cause 
immediate decreases in offenders’ well-being, their effects will 
probably be smaller and of shorter duration than predicted.  And just 
as adding $20,000 to your $100,000 annual salary produces almost no 
more happiness than adding $10,000, losing $20,000 is probably not 
significantly worse than losing half that amount.  
 
 C.   Adaptation to Imprisonment 
 
 Monetary fines are regularly used as punishment in the United 
States, but imprisonment serves as the “linchpin” of the nation’s 
                                                          
45 It is worth pointing out that hedonic adaptation to losses may not be identical 
to adaptation to gains.  Research from the field of behavioral decision theory has 
repeatedly shown that losses loom larger psychologically than do gains.  See Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).  Indeed, losses trigger stronger neural activity than 
do gains.  See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN. 
PSYCHOL. 323 (2001); John T. Cacioppo & G.G. Bernston, Relationship Between 
Attitudes and Evaluative Space: A Critical Review With Emphasis on the 
Separability of Positive and Negative Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401 (1994). 
46 See Kermer et al., supra note 40, at 651. 
47 Id. at 652. 
48 Ed  Diener et al., The Relationship Between Income and Subjective Well-
Being: Relative or Absolute?, 28 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 195 (1993). 
49 Id. at 209 (although not statistically significantly so). 
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response to crime,50 and understanding its effects on offenders is 
essential.  Social scientific interest in prisoners’ responses to 
incarceration began in the 1950s following Donald Clemmer’s theory 
of prisonization, the steady deterioration in prisoners’ physical and 
psychological health over the course of a sentence.51  More recently, 
however, these findings have been challenged by consistent evidence 
that prisoners rapidly adapt to incarceration.52  As with adaptation in 
other domains, incarceration typically results in substantial 
psychological distress upon imprisonment followed quickly by rapid 
gains in well-being and little further change throughout the term.53 
 An early cross-sectional study compared inmates who had 
served one year of a long-term sentence with those who had served 
nine years of such a sentence.54  The recently incarcerated offenders 
exhibited significantly higher levels of self-reported anxiety, 
depression, and psychosomatic illnesses than the longer serving 
inmates.55  According to the authors: 
 
These results suggest that the early period of incarceration 
is particularly stressful for long-term offenders as they 
                                                          
50 F.T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REV. OF RES. 1, 2 (2000). 
51 See DONALD CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY 299 (1958). 
52 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 311-12.  They write, 
“Although incarceration is designed to be unpleasant, most of the research on 
adjustment to prison life points to considerable adaptation following a difficult initial 
adjustment period.”  Id. at 311.  For an early review of the literature, see Lee H. 
Bukstel & Peter R. Kilmann, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment on Confined 
Individuals, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 469 (1980).  The authors find no support for “the 
popular notion that correctional confinement is harmful to most individuals.”  Id. at 
487. 
53 See Timothy J. Flanagan, The Pains of Long-Term Imprisonment, 20 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 148 (1980); Doris L. MacKenzie & Lynne Goodstein, Long-term 
Incarceration Impacts and Characteristics of Long-term Offenders, 12 CRIM. JUST. 
& BEHAV. 395 (1985); EDWARD ZAMBLE & FRANK J. PORPORINO, COPING, 
BEHAVIOR, AND ADAPTATION IN PRISON INMATES (1988) (hereinafter COPING); 
Edward Zamble & Frank Porporino, Coping, Imprisonment, and Rehabilitation: 
Some Data and Their Implications, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 53 (1990) (hereinafter 
Coping & Rehabilitation); Edward Zamble, Behavior and Adaptation in Long-Term 
Prison Inmates: Descriptive Longitudinal Results, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 409 
(1992); Mandeept K. Dhami et al., Adaptation to Imprisonment: Indigenous or 
Imported?, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1085 (2007). 
54 See MacKenzie & Goodstein, supra note 53, at 401. 
55 Id. at 407. 
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make the transition from the outside world to institutional 
life.  No evidence supports the notion of psychological 
deterioration over time.  Instead, with more time served, 
long termers appear to develop strategies for coping with 
prison.56 
 
This evidence for adaptation to prison has been bolstered by 
longitudinal studies tracking inmates across prison terms.57  One such 
study surveyed a group of prisoners regularly over six years.  As in the 
cross-sectional studies, the researchers found that prisoners 
interviewed in their first month of incarceration showed high levels of 
depression and anxiety, but, within a few months, the prisoners’ self-
reported mental health had improved substantially.58  Moreover, 
inmates’ reports of their well-being also rose.59  In interviews 
conducted during their first month in prison, inmates reported a mean 
quality of life (QoL) score of 32.2 out of 100, with more than two-
thirds reporting their QoL below the midpoint of the scale.60  After six 
months in prison, inmates’ QoL reports rose to 38.3, and six years into 
their sentences, inmates had improved to 42.0, with most reporting 
their QoL above the scale’s midpoint.61 
 From these studies a pattern of hedonic response to 
imprisonment emerges.  Initial entry into the prison environment 
triggers significant psychological distress and low levels of well-
being.  Within weeks, however, inmates develop coping mechanisms 
that enable them to adjust to the situation and improve their well-
being.62  After this initial adjustment period, offenders maintain 
                                                          
56 Id. at 409. 
57 See ZAMBLE & PORPORINO, COPING, supra note 53; Dhami et al., supra note 
53. 
58 See Zamble & Porporino, Coping & Rehabilitation, supra note 53, at 64; 
ZAMBLE & PORPORINO, COPING, supra note 53, at 109.  They note that only “3 
months later there was generally some amelioration of the emotional disturbances 
seen at the beginning of the term.”  Id. 
59 See Zamble, supra note 53, at 417.   
60 Id. 
61 Id.  The percentage of inmates reporting that “there are no good things” about 
being in prison also dropped over the six-year period from 48 to 8.  Id.  See also 
Dhami et al., supra note 53, at 1097 (noting, “prisoners with a poor quality of life 
before prison felt happier than before”). 
62 As early as the 16th century, Thomas More recognized prison’s limited impact 
on his own well-being, writing, from his cell to his wife, “is not this house as nigh 
heaven as my own?”  Quoted in ANTHONY KENNY & CHARLES KENNY, LIFE, 
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relatively constant levels of happiness throughout the remainder of 
their terms.63  Thus, the “pains of imprisonment”64 are felt 
immediately, with diminishing hedonic penalties over the remainder of 
the sentence. 
 
 D.   The Long-Term Effects of Prison on Well-Being 
 
 Although being in prison seems to produce only limited 
hedonic deficits for inmates, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
having been in prison, for any length of time, has severe, long-lasting 
effects on post-incarceration well-being.  Researchers have discovered 
that any amount of incarceration creates a significantly higher 
likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health, economic, 
and social harms that will prove extremely difficult to adapt to. 
 Until very recently, it was widely believed that incarceration 
produced no direct, causal effects on ex-inmates’ health, employment, 
and family lives.65  Any correlation between imprisonment and poor 
health or job prospects was thought to be the result of selection effects, 
i.e., the people who ended up in prison disproportionately came from 
groups with bad health and employment opportunities to begin with.66  
In the past few years, however, researchers hit on the idea of applying 
the same longitudinal surveys used to study well-being to track 
offenders in the years before and after imprisonment and thus isolate 
the effects of imprisonment itself.67   
                                                                                                                                         
LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF UTILITY: HAPPINESS IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
ECONOMIC THOUGHT, 59-60 (2006). 
63 There is, however, some evidence that the final few weeks of the sentence 
prove stressful and thus decreases well-being.  See Bukstel & Kilmann, supra note 
52, at 488.  They write, “The typical pattern among these individuals might involve 
an initial adjustment reaction to incarceration, followed by a period of successful 
adjustment with another mild psychological reaction (e.g., ‘short-timer’s syndrome’) 
occurring just prior to release.”  Id. 
64 See GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A 
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958). 
65 See Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term 
Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 117 (2007) 
(noting that “the idea that incarceration is not causally related to health is already 
well accepted”). 
66 Id. 
67 See id.; BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006) 
(tracking employment prospects and wage growth of ex-inmates); Michael 
Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and Other 
Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56 (2008) (studying health 
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 Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
Michael Massoglia has found that ex-inmates have a much higher 
likelihood of reporting health problems associated with stress and 
communicable diseases in the years following incarceration.68  They 
are more than twice as likely to report hepatitis C infections, 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and urinary tract infections.69  Moreover, 
they report substantially higher levels of chronic headaches, sleeping 
problems, dizziness, and heart problems.70  Considering the high 
incidence of prison sexual violence71 and the many stressors 
associated with post-prison life, 72 these results should not be 
surprising. What is surprising, however, is evidence from Massoglia 
and others that the incidence and severity of these health problems are 
unrelated to sentence length.73  Thus, any contact with the prison 
system, no matter how brief, exposes offenders to worse post-
incarceration health outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                         
effects of imprisonment) (hereinafter Exposure); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration, 
Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 275 (2008) (the same) 
(hereinafter Disparities); Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and 
the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721 (2005).  
In the descriptions of these studies, it should be assumed unless otherwise stated that 
the results control for a variety of variables including age, gender, education level, 
health, etc.  For specific control variables, please consult the individual studies. 
68 Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 57. 
69 Massoglia, Disparities, supra note 67, at 296. 
70 Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 65.  It is worth noting, however, that 
imprisonment does not result in higher incidences of all health problems.  Id. 
71 See Tonisha R. Jones & Travis C. Pratt, The Prevalence of Sexual Violence in 
Prison, 52 Int. J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 280, 289 
(2008).  They write, “the research indicates that such studies typically report prison 
sexual victimization rates of around 20%, suggesting that prison sexual victimization 
is a significant problem to be addressed.”  Id. 
72 Massoglia notes, “the experience of incarceration likely acts as a primary 
stressor, while characteristics of life after release—stigma, decreased earnings and 
employment prospects, and family problems—are a series of secondary stressors.”  
Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 57. 
73 Id. at 61.  According to Massoglia, “exposure to incarceration, rather than 
length of incarceration, appears to be more important to the relationship between 
incarceration and health problems.”  Id.  Schnittker and John’s findings concur: 
“[T]he effects of incarceration are such that contact with the prison system is 
generally more important than the amount.”  Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 
125. 
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 Studies examining ex-inmates’ employment prospects report 
similar findings.74  Felony imprisonment results in social stigma, the 
erosion of job skills, and disqualification from stable government and 
union jobs.75  Accordingly, former prisoners experience lower wages, 
slower wage growth, and, importantly, greater unemployment.  
According to Bruce Western, their average annual number of weeks 
worked dropped from 35 before imprisonment to 23 after,76 and they 
tended to have much shorter job tenure.77  Additionally, imprisonment 
was related to poor employment continuity for many years after 
release.78  After release, offenders are typically shunted into secondary 
labor markets with little job security, little opportunity for 
advancement, and miniscule earnings.79 
 Recent research also reveals that ex-inmates are more likely to 
experience substantial disruptions in their post-incarceration family 
and social lives.80  Imprisonment makes communication with family 
and friends difficult and cohabitation with spouses and children 
impossible.81  Moreover, imprisonment likely hinders community 
                                                          
74 See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 116; Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market 
Consequences of Incarceration, 47 Crime & Delinquency 410 (2000); Jeffrey R. 
Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 863 
(2006); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN 
ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007). 
75 See Western et al., supra note 74, at 412.  They write, “incarceration can 
interrupt young men’s transition to stable career employment.  The inaccessibility of 
career jobs to ex-inmates can be explained in several ways.  The stigma of 
incarceration makes ex-inmates unattractive for entry-level or union jobs that may 
require high levels of trust.  In addition, civil disabilities limit ex-felons’ access to 
career employment in skilled trades or the public sector. . . .  Ex-offenders are then 
relegated to spot markets with little prospect for earnings growth.”  Id. at 414. 
76 WESTERN, supra note 67, at 116. 
77 Id. at 123. 
78 Id. at 121. 
79 Western compared hypothetical workers differing only regarding past 
imprisonment and found that a “thirty-year-old black high school dropout, for 
example, earns on average nearly $9,000 annually, with incarceration resulting in a 
reduction of about $3,300.  The parallel white earnings average $14,400, and the 
reduction about $5,200.”  Id. at 120.  He continues, “Without incarceration, 4 percent 
of young blacks—one-fifth of all poor blacks—would be lifted out of poverty, and 
the poverty rate would fall to 14.5 percent.”  Id. at 127. 
80 See id. at 146-47; Lopoo & Western, supra note 67; Beth M. Huebner, The 
Effect of Incarceration on Marriage and Work Over the Life Course, 22 JUST. Q. 281 
(2005). 
81 See Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 117. 
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integration, trust, and intimacy.82  Accordingly, men who have spent 
time in prison are less likely to get married than similar men who have 
not, and they are more than twice as likely to get divorced than their 
never-incarcerated peers.83 
 As bad as these health, employment, and social consequences 
of imprisonment seem, there would seem to be little reason to be 
concerned about them in light of humans’ uncanny ability to adapt 
hedonically.  But as mentioned above, certain experiences are difficult 
or impossible to adapt to and cause long-lasting diminutions in well-
being.  The effects of imprisonment—chronic and deteriorating illness, 
unemployment, and the loss of family and social ties—have all been 
found to be particularly resistant to adaptation.   
 The health problems that imprisonment exposes inmates to, 
including chronic headaches, hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis, 
significantly and consistently diminish self-reported quality of life in 
sufferers, even with treatment.84  People who become unemployed end 
up with lower baseline levels of happiness, and these decreases last 
even after they find new jobs.85  Additionally, longer terms of 
unemployment result in more intense well-being penalties.86  And 
although economic losses above the poverty line generally do not 
cause significant changes in well-being, many ex-inmates are likely to 
                                                          
82 Id. 
83 See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 146-48. 
84 See Guitera et al., supra note 27, at 1062; Tsui et al., supra note 31, at 603; 
Hays et al., supra note 30, at 714. 
85 See Richard A. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life 
Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8, 11 (2004); Richard A. Lucas, Adaptation and the 
Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 75, 77 (2007); Andrew E. Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A 
Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008); Michael Argyle, 
Causes and Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at 362-63. 
Lucas et al. write: 
The experience of unemployment did, on average, alter people’s set-
point levels of life satisfaction.  People were less satisfied in the years 
following unemployment than they were before unemployment, and this 
decline occurred even though individuals eventually regained employment.  
Furthermore, the changes from baseline were very stable from the reaction 
period to the adaptation period—individuals who experienced a large drop 
in satisfaction during unemployment were very likely to be far from 
baseline many years after becoming reemployed. 
Lucas et al, supra, at 11.  Or as Clark et al. put it, “unemployment starts off bad and 
pretty much stays bad.”  Clark et al., supra, at F231. 
86 See Lucas et al, supra note 85, at 10. 
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find themselves in the lowest part of the income curve where wage 
differences matter.87 
 Imprisonment’s impact on ex-inmates’ family and social lives 
is likely to have the most severe consequences for well-being due to its 
multiple effects.  First, the increased likelihood of divorce will have 
direct effects on well-being, because adaptation to divorce is often 
slow and incomplete.88  Additionally, strong social and family ties 
have been shown to encourage adaptation,89 and the disruptions 
inflicted by incarceration will be deleterious to a prisoner’s ability to 
adapt to other negative events.90  Finally, a variety of learned 
behaviors that enable inmates to cope with the experience of 
incarceration, including mistrust, blunted emotions, and lack of 
planning, are likely to prove maladaptive “on the outside.”91 
 In the years following release from prison, ex-inmates are 
likely to suffer from a variety of problems that cause long-lasting 
diminution of their well-being.  Working alone or in tandem, the 
negative health, employment, and social effects of imprisonment have 
severe consequences for lifelong happiness independent of the length 
of a prisoner’s incarceration.  Although offenders are capable of 
rapidly adapting to being in prison, they have little hope of adapting to 
the penalties prison imposes on their health, work, and family lives. 
 
* * * 
 
                                                          
87 See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 127. 
88 See Richard A. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study 
of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945 (2005); David R. 
Johnson & Jian Wu, An Empirical Test of Crisis, Social Selection, and Role 
Explanations of the Relationship Between Marital Disruption and Psychological 
Distress: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Four-Wave Panel Data, 64 J. MARRIAGE 
& FAM. 211 (2002). 
89 See, e.g., Argyle, supra note 85, at 363 (noting that the “effects of 
unemployment are greater if there is little social support”). 
90 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 314-15. 
91 See Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 126-27.  They write: 
For example, relinquishing initiative and relying on external constraints 
may be rewarded in a prison setting, but these characteristics can be 
problematic in a home or workplace.  By the same token, vigilance, 
mistrust, and blunted emotions might help prisoners to cope with an 
especially violent environment.  These dispositions might also, however, 
elevate risk for cardiovascular disease and other stress-related illnesses. 
Id. at 126; see also Zamble & Porporino, Coping & Rehabilitation, supra note 53, at 
68. 
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 Contemporary punishment theories all require knowledge of 
the offender’s subjective experience of punishment, but until very 
recently, scientific data on punishment’s effects was unavailable.  New 
research can now provide some of that data, and recent findings 
challenge fundamental intuitions about how punishment inflicts 
suffering.  Central to this research is the phenomenon of hedonic 
adaptation.  Many life events, including economic losses and time 
spent incarcerated, produce only fleeting impacts on reported 
happiness.  Moreover, due to the rapidity and strength of adaptation, 
even substantial differences in the sizes of penalties, whether larger 
fines or longer prison terms, fail to generate significantly different 
hedonic effects.  Yet while inmates quickly adjust to being in prison, 
incarceration causes a variety of long-term consequences that are 
resistant to hedonic adaptation and that are unrelated to sentence 
length.  Thus, the hedonic impact of all fines is relatively equal and 
smaller than predicted, and the impact of all terms of imprisonment is 
relatively equal and big but not in the way imagined. 
 
II.  ADAPTATION, FORECASTING ERRORS, AND ASYMMETRY IN 
UTILITARIAN CALCULATIONS OF PUNISHMENT 
 
 In this Part, we apply the foregoing research on hedonism and 
hedonic adaptation to utilitarian theories of punishment.  We find that 
adaptation to imprisonment itself may enable deterrence at a lower 
utilitarian cost than was previously believed possible.  At the same 
time, however, the hedonic effects of incarceration on post-prison life 
may produce the opposite effect.  The social and economic 
dislocations caused by felony convictions may be imposing 
hedonically excessive punishments while simultaneously inhibiting 
efforts to appropriately calibrate deterrence of both first-time offenders 
and recidivists. 
 
 A.  Utilitarian Theory and the Linkage of Deterrence and Pain 
 
 The goal of utilitarianism, in the words of its founder, Jeremy 
Bentham, “is to augment the total happiness of the community; and 
therefore, in the first place to exclude, as far as may be, every thing 
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that tends to subtract from that happiness.”92  In designing and 
analyzing systems of criminal punishment, utilitarian theorists are thus 
primarily concerned with achieving adequate and effective 
deterrence—of setting punishment at a level sufficiently high to 
dissuade potential offenders from committing crime.93  Among 
utilitarians, the temptation to impose increasingly harsher penalties is 
strong and omnipresent.  The optimal social frequency of most crimes 
is exactly zero; the country would likely be better off if there were no 
murders, no armed robberies, no assaults, and so forth.94  This is by 
                                                          
92 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation, in JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN STUART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS 162, 
166 (1961). 
93 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, Pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J. 
BENTHAM’S WORKS 396, 402 (1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of 
that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he 
expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from 
performing it.”); HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 806 (1953) (“If I were having a 
philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should 
say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable 
by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard your- 
self as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its 
promises.”).  Utilitarians have focused in addition on two other related objectives, 
incapacitation of dangerous persons and rehabilitation of criminals in order to render 
them suitable to re-enter society.  These goals of punishment have crept out of favor, 
however, as prisons have proven to be poor vehicles for reforming offenders, Robert 
Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 36 PUB. 
INT. 22 (1974) (arguing that rehabilitative efforts have failed to accomplish their 
goals), and incapacitation has had little noticeable effect on the rates of serious 
crimes.  FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 100–27 (1995) 
(finding that increased incarceration rates in California led to a 15% decrease in 
overall crime rates but did not influence the rates of violent crimes such as assaults, 
robberies, and murders); John J. DiIulio, Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 12, 1999.  Rehabilitation and incapacitation also 
declined as working theories of punishment because they could offer no response to 
the critique that they seemed to compel excessive and indefinite punishment of even 
minor crimes.  Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 
(1968).  We focus here upon deterrence, which remains the principal utilitarian goal 
of punishment.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (“The general purposes of 
the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders are: (a) to 
prevent the commission of offenses . . . .”). 
94 We exploit here the definition of a “murder” or other type of crime.  
Obviously there are circumstances in which killings will be welfare-enhancing, but 
those justified killings are not properly classified as murder.  By definition, “murder” 
includes only unjustified killings.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (“Conduct 
which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to 
another is justifiable . . . .”). 
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contrast to the civil tort context, where the threat of over-deterrence is 
a persistent problem.95  (Imagine the economic damage if the 
punishment for causing a car accident were set at $1 million and 
people ceased driving.)  Because most crimes must be intentional, and 
because the majority of them deviate so strongly from acceptable 
norms of conduct—robbery and assault do not resemble socially 
permitted conduct, while negligent driving at least bears a resemblance 
to safe driving—there is less fear that some socially productive 
activity will be chilled through stiff penalties on crime. 
 Rather, from a utilitarian perspective, the most significant 
check on the degree of punishment is the cost associated with the 
punishment itself.96  Part of that cost derives from the public expense 
of detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal,97 and part of it relates 
to the opportunity cost of removing individuals from the workforce 
and transferring them to comparatively unproductive confinement.98  
For present purposes, however, the most important component of these 
costs is the pain inflicted upon the criminal himself.99  For a strict 
utilitarian, the criminal’s welfare is part of the overall calculus:100 the 
                                                          
95 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–71 
(2007) (describing the theory of optimal tort damages). 
96 See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005) 
(explaining that most modern systems set punishment “not only [by reference to] 
traditional crime-control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation, but also a concept known as parsimony—a preference for the least 
severe alternative that will achieve the purposes of the sentence”).  A second 
important consideration is the need to achieve marginal deterrence; we address this 
point in greater detail in section II.C., infra. 
97 See Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: 
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996) 
(analyzing the cost to taxpayers of incarceration). 
98 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. 
POL. ECON. 169, 193 (1968) (“[I]n the United States in 1965, about $1 billion was 
spent on ‘correction,’ and this estimate excludes, of course, the value of the loss in 
offenders’ time.”). 
99 We employ the feminine pronoun here because it is our preferred convention, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of prisoners are male and the behavioral studies 
we discuss employed only male subjects. 
100 Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals, 94 YALE L.J. 
315, 320 (1984) (“Traditionally, utilitarians have begun with the premise that the 
criminal justice system should minimize the sum of the costs of crime and crime 
prevention. Since everyone's welfare is included in the social calculus, the cost of 
crime prevention includes . . . also the suffering imposed upon criminals made to 
undergo punishment.”); Margery Fry, Bentham and English Penal Reform, in 
JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAW 28 (1948) (“the suffering of a punished criminal 
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utilitarian goal is to increase the overall welfare of society, and the 
criminal, despite her deviance from societal norms, remains a part of 
that society. 
 Accordingly, deterrence and social cost have typically been 
thought to move in a type of proportionate lock-step.  The greater the 
deterrence effect desired, the greater the necessary punishment; but as 
punishment (and consequently deterrence) increases, so too does the 
social price paid to purchase that deterrence.  Utilitarian legislators 
who draft sentencing codes, and utilitarian judges who impose 
sentences, are thus forced to come to some sort of accommodation 
between the twin goals of achieving deterrence and of lessening the 
social price paid for punishment, and much of the struggle in setting 
appropriate levels of punishment centers around this difficult question 
of balancing.101 
Utilitarian theorists have heretofore assumed that the deterrent 
“punch” of punishment was equal to the pain that punishment inflicted 
upon an offender, and that, fundamentally, deterrence could not be 
uncoupled from its utilitarian cost.  If a lawmaker or judge wished to 
obtain additional deterrence power by increasing the punishment for 
some crime, she could not avoid the cost of imposing it upon the 
criminals who broke the law regardless.  The utilitarian pain inflicted 
by punishment was, by this accounting, the necessary purchase price 
of deterrence.  Yet new theories of hedonic adaptation cast doubt upon 
this formerly immutable principle. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
goes duly down on the debit side, and must be balanced by some greater good in the 
credit column”); Levitt, supra note 97, at 347 (acknowledging that typical studies 
may underestimate the costs of incarceration because of the unacknowledged “pain 
and suffering of prisoners and their families”); R. B. Brandt, Conscience (Rule) 
Utilitarianism and the Criminal Law, 14 L. & PHILOSOPHY, 65, 73 (1995) 
(referencing “harm to . . . convicted criminals”); Carl Emigholz, Note, 
Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug Crime Sentencing 
Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583, 599 
(2006) (“In the utilitarian calculus, the criminal justice system implicates a negative 
social cost: the crime . . . and pain inflicted upon the criminal as a result of the meted 
punishment.”). 
101 Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (listing “to prevent the 
commission of offenses” as the first purpose of the Code sections governing 
punishment) with id. § 1.02(2)(c) (stating that the third purpose of the same sections 
is “to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary 
punishment”) (emphasis added).  
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 B.   Deterrence, Cost, and Adaptation to Punishment 
 
 As we discuss in Part I, new evidence regarding hedonic 
adaptation gives rise to strong inferences that people will adapt over 
time to criminal punishment, whether that punishment takes the form 
of a monetary penalty or a prison sentence.  That is to say, the 
convicted criminal’s felt experience of punishment will diminish in 
severity over time: both the prisoner and the recipient of a fine will be 
happier one year after the punishment is imposed than she was after 
one day, even if the prisoner remains behind bars and irrespective of 
whether the fined criminal has recovered any of the lost funds.102 
 This adaptation, and the forecasting errors that accompany it, 
sever the close linkage between the deterrent power of punishment and 
its cost.  Regardless of the duration of punishment, criminals will feel 
it less harshly than they (or anyone else) expected.  At the same time, 
they will fail to anticipate their own adaptation, even if they are repeat 
offenders who have been punished before.103  Indeed, criminals and 
the people who sanction them—juries, judges, and legislators—will 
make the same ex ante errors in failing to forecast adaptation.  
Deterrence is, of course, an ex ante phenomenon—putative criminals 
decide which course of action to pursue based upon their expected 
outcomes.  Consequently, criminals will be deterred to the same extent 
that they would be in the absence of adaptation.  Punishment will 
serve its primary purpose, but at lower cost than anyone had 
anticipated. 
 
  1.   Total Pain  
 
 When deciding upon a punishment, policymakers—the 
legislators who design the system of punishment and set its metes and 
bounds, and the judges who impose punishment—must consider the 
effect of that punishment upon the criminal herself.  From a 
consequentialist perspective, the harm inflicted upon the criminal 
serves as a type of check on the appropriate severity of a sentence and 
a cost to be minimized wherever possible.104  A policymaker imposing 
                                                          
102 See supra notes 42–64 and accompanying text. 
103 See Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 35; Ubel, supra 
note 36, at 111; Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra note 37. 
104 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2008) (“The court shall impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . .”); Model Penal Code § 1.02(2) (“The 
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a sentence necessarily must believe that she can anticipate—within 
reasonable bounds—the severity of that sentence and the pain that it 
will inflict.  (Sentencing would otherwise constitute an entirely 
random exercise.)  One component of that predictability is the 
assumption that the severity of a sentence will scale approximately 
proportionately to its length or, in the case of a fine, its amount. 
 Adaptation uproots this assumption.  As we describe above, 
people suffer from biases when predicting both the intensity and the 
duration of punishment.  They will believe it to be worse than it truly 
is, even initially, and they will anticipate that it will last longer than it 
does in fact.105  Thus, prison and punitive fines will impose smaller 
hedonic costs upon their recipients than expected, and those costs will 
ameliorate over time; two years in prison are not twice as painful as 
one year.  As prisoners adapt, they likely return to hedonic states that 
more closely resemble their pre-prison experiences. 
 As a consequence, policymakers’ forecasting errors (coupled 
with prisoners’ adaptation) introduce a systematic bias into their 
estimations of the effect of punishment.  Punishment—whether by fine 
or by imprisonment—is simply not as painful as they believe or 
predict.  In section II.B.2 below we discuss the potential negative 
ramifications of this bias, but for the moment we note only its 
beneficial impact: any given punishment imposes less pain upon the 
recipient and exacts a smaller utilitarian cost than previously 
believed.  For a consequentialist, this promises a meaningful 
improvement over the perceived status quo.  
 
  2.   Deterrence  
 
 The usual corollary to this decreasing punishment would be a 
concomitant diminishment in its deterrent power—a negative 
repercussion by nearly any accounting.  But here there exists an 
important asymmetry between deterrence and the felt experience of 
punishment.  A proper accounting of punishment’s hedonic cost can 
be made only ex post—after the punishment has already been 
administered.  Hedonic adaptation will lessen the impact of that 
                                                                                                                                         
general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of 
offenders are: . . . (c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or 
arbitrary punishment . . . .”); supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
105 Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 35. 
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punishment over time, and so this ex post accounting will necessarily 
include the ameliorating effects of that adaptation. 
Deterrence, on the other hand, is an ex ante phenomenon: the 
important issue is what punishment the prospective criminal believes 
she will suffer if she is caught and punished, not the punishment that 
she eventually receives.106  In the ex ante position, the criminal will 
not anticipate her adaptation to punishment.  Quite to the contrary, she 
will be subject to a focusing illusion as to that punishment’s severity; 
her expectation of the punishment will far exceed what she will, in 
fact, experience.107  At the same time, the policymakers charged with 
meting out punishments—legislators, judges, and juries—will be 
subject to the same focusing illusions.  They will similarly fail to 
anticipate the criminal’s adaptation, and they will imagine a 
punishment to be harsher than it actually is.  Criminals and the people 
charged with punishing them may differ in their evaluations of 
punishment on other grounds—criminals may have higher discount 
rates than policymakers expect,108 or they may have more information 
as to the conditions of confinement109—but along the dimension of 
                                                          
106 Our account in this respect differs from the very interesting points made by 
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?  A Behavioral 
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 173, 188–89 (2004).  Robinson and 
Darley suggest in passing that adaptation to prison will inhibit deterrence, id., but 
they do not account for the fact that putative criminals will evaluate whether or not 
to commit a crime before they have been incarcerated, and thus before they learn that 
they will adapt.  In addition, even potential recidivists will forget about their own 
adaptation once they have been released; without this learning, they will be subject 
to the full deterrence force of threatened punishment each subsequent time they 
contemplate a crime.  See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text. 
107 Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra note 37. 
108 That is to say, by comparison to the general population, criminals may 
weight the present far more heavily than the future when deciding upon a course of 
action.  See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND 
HUMAN NATURE (1985); see also David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, 
Punishment, and Myopia 4, 30 (unpublished manuscript 2005), available at 
http://www.columbia.edu/?~wbm2103/?Courses/Papers-SLEPP/Lee-NBER-
11491.pdf (demonstrating that hyperbolic discount is more common among 
criminals than the general population); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1539–40 (1998).  See also David 
Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445-46 
(1997). 
109 See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault’s Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits 
for Professional Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 470 n.346 (2004) (noting 
prisoners’ first-hand information regarding the conditions of confinement); Daniel 
M. Donovan, Jr., Note: Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting Prisoner 
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hedonic forecasting they will behave similarly.110  Hedonic adaptation 
thus introduces not an interpersonal asymmetry, but an intertemporal 
one: criminals may experience punishment differently than they 
anticipated at an earlier point in time, but different people forecasting 
the impact of punishment at the same moment will reach similar 
conclusions. 
 This felicitous asymmetry is threatened, however, by the 
prospect that recidivist criminals might learn from their past 
experiences.  Having once experienced punishment (and the attendant 
adaptation), the criminal might understand that she will learn to 
accommodate the punishment she receives and that the initial shock of 
being thrown into prison or fined a large amount will soon dissipate.  
Such information, in the hands of repeat offenders, would diminish the 
deterrent power of punishment, perhaps substantially.  Yet remarkably 
this learning does not take place, as we note above.111  People, as a 
general rule, do not remember their adaptive responses to negative 
stimuli.112  They report their experiences to others as having been 
worse than they really were, and they do not draw upon their 
experiences to make more accurate predictions on subsequent 
occasions.  Because they do not learn, they cannot disseminate any 
information about adaptation effects to the broader community, which 
remains similarly ignorant.  The consequence is that affective 
forecasting errors are remarkably consistent over time: having 
overestimated the harshness of prison once, people are likely to do so 
again, and to similar degree.  The intertemporal asymmetry introduced 
by adaptation is resistant to even a particular individual’s life 
experience. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Correspondence with the Media, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991) 
(describing the informational value of prisoners’ letters from prison). 
110 No study has yet observed any differences in how various groups of people 
experience adaptation or forecast their future happiness.  See, e.g., Nick Sevdalis & 
Nigel Harvey, Predicting Preferences: A Neglected Aspect of Shared Decision-
Making, 9 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 245, 248 (2006) (finding no evidence that 
“doctors are better equipped than their patients to judge the latter's future ‘best 
interests’”).  This is not to say that such differences cannot exist—and these 
conclusions are certainly tentative, pending future research—but at the moment there 
is no reason to believe that they do. 
111 Ayton et al., supra note 39.  
112 Wilson et al., Lessons From the Past, supra note 41, at 1649. 
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  3.   Adaptation Effects in Combination 
 
 Viewed side-by-side, these two consequences of adaptation—
that people adapt but fail to anticipate their adaptation—have 
significant ramifications for utilitarian theories of punishment.  
Adaptation severs the linkage between deterrence and the pain 
inflicted upon a criminal: policymakers are able to achieve adequate 
deterrence at a lower cost than was believed possible.  As a result, 
consequentialist calculations of the costs of punishment have been 
skewed upwards.  A proper cost-benefit accounting of various forms 
and methods of punishment—be they monetary fines or terms of 
imprisonment—must include the power of adaptation to lessen the 
burden of punishment as the criminal experiences it, while 
simultaneously obscuring that anticipated advantage from the criminal 
both before and after the fact.  For the utilitarian punishment theorist, 
hedonic adaptation appears to represent an essentially unalloyed good. 
 
 C.   The Post Hoc Effects of Confinement 
 
 The previous sections were concerned only with the effects of 
adaptation upon a criminal’s felt reaction to a particular punishment 
itself—i.e., the criminal’s experience while in prison or in coping with 
a punitive fine.  With respect to imprisonment, however, the hedonic 
impact of punishment does not conclude when the prisoner is released.  
A convicted felon feels the lingering after-effects of imprisonment in 
nearly every area of her life, ranging from legal, to social, to 
economic.  In many cases, these ongoing ramifications of 
imprisonment are not easily adaptable.  Consequently, prison holds the 
capacity to impose hedonic harms beyond what a simple snapshot of 
life in prison would reveal. 
 The social and economic effects of having served time in 
prison can be extremely serious.113  As we outline in Part I, prisoners 
                                                          
113 A lengthy prison term—or, more accurately, the state of being a “convicted 
felon”—carries with it a number of legal deficiencies that time does not cure.  
Federal law prohibits anyone who has served more than one year in prison from 
possessing a firearm of any sort.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2008).  Ten states currently 
prohibit convicted felons from voting even after they are no longer associated with 
the criminal justice system, while an additional ten states prevent felons from voting 
if they have been released on probation or parole.  ProCon.org, State Felon Voting 
Laws (2007), available at 
http://felonvoting.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=286.  Nonetheless, these 
 
 
 
 
 Happiness & Punishment 27 
often witness the breakups of their marriages and relationships while 
in prison and have greater difficulty forming other relationships 
(including friendships) upon their release.114  They experience greater 
rates of unemployment.115  Ex-prisoners also suffer from more 
debilitating health problems and far higher rates of incurable diseases 
than the general population.116  And as we describe above, unlike the 
loss of money—or even permanent physical injuries117—these types of 
afflictions have severe long-term hedonic effects and are very difficult 
to adapt to.  In particular, unemployment and the dissolution of social 
ties are two of the most reliable predictors of long-term unhappiness 
and anxiety.118  Measured against an individual’s happiness before 
being caught and convicted, life after prison bears in many respects a 
greater resemblance to life in prison than it does to life before prison. 
 The ramifications of this deterioration of post-prison life are 
two-fold.  First, it raises the possibility that consequentialist 
calculations of the costs of punishment may again be biased—
downward, this time.  Any cost-benefit analysis of punishment that 
terminates when the criminal is released from prison would understate 
the negative effects that begin or endure after the prison term has 
finished.119  It is worth noting that these negative effects do not accrue 
only to the former prisoner.  Individual unemployment and social 
dislocation impose significant negative externalities upon the rest of 
society; the former prisoner frequently must be supported by state aid 
and is more likely to commit further crimes.120 
                                                                                                                                         
penalties are unlikely to have any significant hedonic effects.  No study has shown 
any hedonic impact from the loss of a capacity as circumscribed as the right to carry 
a gun or to vote, and it seems implausible that the loss of such rights would register 
hedonically on nearly the same magnitude as far more significant life events such as 
births, deaths, illness, or financial shocks. 
114 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.    
115 See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.    
116 See Massoglia, supra note 67, at 57 & 296. 
117 See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 2 (describing adaptation to 
certain types of debilitating physical injuries). 
118 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.    
119 See Levitt, supra note 97, at 346–47 (cataloguing a variety of prior studies 
that fail to incorporate the post hoc costs of imprisonment to the prisoner);  Becker, 
supra note 98, at 179–80 (limiting discussion of the costs of punishment to those 
incurred while the punishment is ongoing). 
120 WESTERN,  supra note 67 (finding strong effects of prison on unemployment 
and future life prospects, including a 30% diminution in wages and an 11% decline 
in the probability of getting married for African-American men); NEAL SHOVER, 
GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT THIEVES 146 (1996) 
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 Second, the harsh impact of imprisonment on post-prison life 
has uncertain but possibly damaging consequences for efforts to set 
deterrence levels accurately.  The initial problem, of course, is that 
prison sentences exact a much greater toll than their term of years.  
The question, then, is which actors within the criminal justice system 
realize this fact ex ante, when the question of deterrence is relevant.    
It is hard to be certain about the minds of the legislators who draft 
sentencing codes, the judges who impose sentence, and especially the 
putative criminals who contemplate committing illegal acts.  Reliable 
studies of this subject simply do not exist, perhaps because its hedonic 
significance has not yet been fully appreciated. 
In many cases, however, the silence is deafening.  No 
sentencing code directs judges to take account of the post hoc effects 
of the punishments they are considering imposing.121  The public 
record is similarly devoid of indications that politicians are concerned 
about the lingering effects of prison upon convicted criminals.122 
For potential offenders, the picture may not be quite so clear.  
Criminals discount the future so strongly that some scholars believe 
that even increasing prison terms beyond ten or twenty years provides 
little additional deterrence.123  On the other hand, at least one study has 
demonstrated that punitive measures that affect only life after prison—
in this case, laws that force convicted sex offenders to notify local 
                                                                                                                                         
(“Most ex-convicts live menial or derelict lives and many die early of alcoholism or 
drug use, or by suicide.”); Dermot Sullivan, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring, 
and Criminal Records Checks: New York’s Need to Reevaluate its Priorities to 
Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 581, 596 (1998) (noting the 
connection between unemployment and recidivism). 
121 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2008) (directing federal judges to consider a 
host of factors when imposing sentence, none of which relates to the prisoner’s post-
correctional experience). 
122 The lone counter-example may be the treatment of juvenile offenders, who 
have the opportunity to expunge convictions from their records in many states.  See 
T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of 
Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 887 n.9 
(1996) (collecting state statutes allowing for expungement of juvenile records).  Of 
course, the simple fact that a criminal record has been expunged will by no means 
ameliorate all of the negative after-effects of prison, which are due as much to the 
social separation imposed by prison as to the legal status of being a convicted felon.  
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
123 See generally WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 108 (describing the 
extremely high discount rates of criminals and their effects on deterrence); see also 
infra note 130 (approaching this question from the perspective of adaptation and the 
post-hoc effects of imprisonment).  
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residents when they are released from prison124—have demonstrably 
positive effects on deterrence.125  For at least one population of 
potential criminals, then, the post-prison effects of incarceration play a 
meaningful role in ex ante decision-making. 
This finding raises the implication that legislators and judges—
through their failure to consider the significant hedonic effects of 
prison on post-prison life—have been systematically underestimating 
the deterrent effect of prison sentences.  Prospective criminals may be 
figuring post hoc effects of imprisonment into the deterrent calculus; 
policymakers almost surely are not.  Policymakers thus may be over-
punishing, failing to calibrate sentences accurately to achieve 
necessary deterrence at the lowest possible hedonic cost. 
 Moreover, the straightforward problems with accuracy aside, 
the manner in which the effects of punishment are actually felt greatly 
complicates efforts to calibrate penalties to crimes.  The difficulty 
arises from the fact that much of the hedonic sanction involved in a 
jail term is effectively front-loaded.  The negative post-prison 
repercussions of having served a prison term accrue to essentially any 
convicted felon: the differences in post-prison outcomes between 
felons who were incarcerated for shorter terms and those incarcerated 
for longer terms are minimal.126  This implies that much of the pain 
associated with incarceration is fixed, unchangeable once a felon has 
served at least a few years behind bars.  Consequently, for instance, a 
two-year prison sentence is much more than fifty percent as punitive 
as a four-year sentence.127  Tacking additional years onto the end of a 
                                                          
124 These laws were inspired by a New Jersey statute known as “Megan’s Law” 
(after the child victim who inspired its passage).  N.J.S. 2C:7-1 et seq. (2008).  There 
is now a federal mandate requiring every state to pass similar legislation.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 14071(d)(2) (2008) (“The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release 
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific 
person required to register under this section . . . . The release of information under 
this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an Internet site containing such 
information that is available to the public . . . .”). 
125 J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior? (unpublished manuscript 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100663, at 23–26 (finding that offender 
notification laws reduced first-time commissions of crimes). 
126 Massoglia, supra note 67, at 61; Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 125 
(“contact with the prison system is generally more important than the amount”). 
127 This is true irrespective of criminals’ high discount rates, about which see 
supra note 108.  Precipitous discounting will cause criminals to view a four year 
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prison sentence will alter the overall punitive calculation less than 
intuition would suggest, particularly because the same years that 
convicted criminals would have spent outside of prison (but, with 
longer sentences, will now spend inside) would likely have been 
unhappy ones. 
 This front-loading severely complicates efforts to achieve 
marginal deterrence against first-time offenders.  Any system of 
punishment must impose heavier penalties for more serious crimes in 
order to coerce criminals into committing less serious crimes 
whenever possible.128  For instance, if burglary, armed robbery, and 
murder were all punishable by life in prison, potential burglars might 
elect to commit the more serious crime of armed robbery instead, 
calculating that they have little to lose; similarly, burglars who were in 
danger of being apprehended might not hesitate to commit murder.  If 
a significant proportion of the hedonic punishment for a crime attaches 
after a single year in prison, and if potential offenders take the post-
prison ramifications of punishment into consideration when deciding 
whether to commit a crime (a plausible assumption129), then the 
variation in deterrence among different punishments begins to 
disintegrate.130 
The hedonic impact of post-prison punishment will also 
interfere with the deterrence of recidivists, though not because they 
possess any capacity to learn from their experiences.  Rather, felons 
                                                                                                                                         
sentence as less than half as harsh as a two year sentence; the post-prison hedonic 
costs of incarceration will have a similar (and compounding) effect. 
128 E.g., Eyal Zadir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: 
Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 379 
n.211 (2008); Bentham, supra note 92, at 168. 
129 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (finding evidence to support this 
hypothesis). 
130 That criminals have extremely high discount rates is now a commonplace.  
See supra note 108.  Economists, however, remain divided as to the theory behind 
this criminal behavior, and no fully satisfying explanation has yet emerged.  Our 
argument, if it is correct, suggests the possibility that some behavior previously 
explained through high discount rates may in fact be attributable to other causes.  
Instead, offenders may be responding rationally to the front-loading of punishment 
in jail sentences, understanding that much of the hedonic cost of being imprisoned 
will accrue whether they are forced to serve two years or ten.  (This would, however, 
only apply to first-time criminals; recidivists, having been imprisoned once, will 
have already been afflicted with most of the negative effects of having served time.)  
This theory is, of course, highly contingent and highly tentative, but it raises 
questions about prior assumptions regarding the level of information possessed by 
first-time offenders. 
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who have been convicted and imprisoned at least once already face 
severely diminished happiness outside of prison due to the social and 
economic dislocations caused by their prior stints behind bars.  When 
they contemplate whether to commit further crimes, they must weigh 
the hedonic consequences of prison against their devalued post-
conviction lives, not their happier pre-prison lives.  If putative 
offenders have less to lose by being sent to jail, they will be more 
likely to select crime over law-abiding behavior. 
Of course, it is not news that convicted criminals face reduced 
opportunities—particularly economic—after release from prison and 
are more likely to opt for criminal activity as a result.131  To this well-
tread territory our analysis contributes two salient components.  First, 
these post-prison deprivations impose some of the most serious 
hedonic injuries possible; few things are as debilitating to hedonic 
well-being as unemployment and the breakup of social ties.132  And 
second, these hedonic effects will persist; the conditions of being 
unemployed or deprived of social ties are extremely difficult to adapt 
to.133  The reduced opportunity costs that give rise to repeat offending 
are unlikely to dissipate; more likely, they will persist throughout 
much of the remainder of the criminal’s life.  Thus, while adaptation to 
punishment itself offers the promise of appropriate deterrence at a 
reduced price, the post-prison cost of imprisonment threatens to 
reverse that same calculation, heightening pain while inhibiting its 
ability to deter. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 For utilitarian theorists of punishment, hedonic adaptation 
offers a mixed set of solutions and new problems.  Adaptation loosens 
                                                          
131 For a small sampling of this extensive literature (here applied to sex 
offenders), see Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 125, at 27–28 (finding that reduced 
opportunities after conviction lead to greater rates of recidivism); W. Edwards & C. 
Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender Management Legislation and Policy: 
Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community Notification Laws, 
45 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIM. 83 (2001) (same); L. Presser & 
E. Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender Notification a Form of 
Community Justice?, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 299 (1999) (same); R.A. Prentky, 
Community Notification and Constructive Risk Reduction, 11 J. OF INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 295 (1996) (same). 
132 See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.    
133 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.    
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the link between deterrence and harm, suggesting that policymakers 
will be able to achieve adequate deterrence while inflicting less pain 
upon criminals.  At the same time, the devastating hedonic effects of 
incarceration upon post-prison life may have the opposite effect.  
Punishment may well be more severe than any policymaker realizes, 
and the ongoing nature of this punishment may skew both marginal 
deterrence (as applied to first-time offenders) and overall deterrence 
(as applied to recidivists). 
However, these forces will not counterbalance.  For most 
criminals, the post-prison hedonic costs imposed by incarceration will 
likely overwhelm the benefits of adaptation to prison simply because 
they endure for much longer.  Difficulties with deterrence introduced 
by front-loaded punishment will only compound the problem.   If 
lawmakers and judges are to establish a workable punitive system, 
they must find some means of circumventing the distortions 
introduced by hedonic adaptation (and its absence). 
 
IV.  RETRIBUTIVE AND MIXED THEORIES 
 
 Most scholars today do not deem punishment justified solely 
by its capacity to increase overall welfare.  Instead, they focus at least 
in part on the idea that a criminal deserves to be punished.  This 
retributive principle is for some the entire justification of punishment 
and for others a supplement to or a limitation on the pursuit of 
utilitarian objectives. 
 For a retributivist of any stripe, it is of core importance to 
understand the actual amount of harm that punishment inflicts.  The 
retributive theory supplanted utilitarianism principally by emphasizing 
that it is unacceptable to punish the innocent or to punish excessively 
the guilty, even if doing so would increase utility.  A cornerstone of 
retributivism is thus that the state may impose suffering only on those 
who deserve it (criminal offenders) and only in an amount that they 
deserve (proportional to the severity of their wrongdoing).  For most 
retributivists, imposing deserved punishment is not only permissible 
but also required.  Imposing too much harm for a minor crime is 
unacceptable under the theory, as is imposing too little harm for a 
major crime.  It would be wrong, on the retributivist account, to allow 
a murderer to go unpunished or to give him an insufficiently severe 
punishment (such as a small fine).  Therefore, retribution can be 
implemented only via a spectrum of punishments that impose varying 
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degrees of harm.  The level of harm must be adjusted to accord with 
the offender’s desert. 
If a criminal justice system offers only the blunt choice 
between a small imposition of harm (a fine) and a large imposition of 
harm (a prison term), then it denies the state the capacity to tailor a 
punishment to fit the crime.  This thwarts the system from fulfilling 
the demands of retributive punishment theories.  Moreover, if 
increasing the amount of a fine or the length of a prison term does not 
meaningfully increase the harm imposed on an offender, then any 
quantum of punishment carries less retributive force than has been 
supposed.  Adaptation dulls the punitive effect of fines and 
incarceration, thereby changing the calculus by which a retributive 
theory must assign amounts of punishment.  If X amount of harm is 
deserved, will a fine of N dollars be sufficient to impose that harm?  
The answer must take into account the (large) effect of adaptation and 
accordingly reduce the level of harm equated with the fine.  This Part 
considers several leading theories from the retributive family and 
evaluates the extent to which those theories are affected by the 
behavioral insights about punishment detailed in Part II. 
 
A. Pure Retributivism 
 
 Although utilitarianism134 was preeminent in both political 
philosophy and punishment theory for most of the twentieth century, it 
has been displaced in both arenas in the past few decades.  In political 
theory, the change can be traced primarily to the publication of John 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.  In punishment theory, there were several 
                                                          
134 Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 
VA. L. REV. 677, 737-38 (2005) (“The purpose of punishment, under [the utilitarian] 
view, is not to give each criminal what he or she deserves, but to deter future crimes, 
to incapacitate criminals by keeping them ‘off the streets,’ or to rehabilitate criminals 
so they would become better citizens.”); see also Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice 
and the Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for Vengeance As a Justification for 
Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1162 (2004) (“Utilitarians are forward 
looking; they countenance punishment only if a social good will come from it.”); 
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of 
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 (2002) (“Whatever goal is 
espoused, utilitarian-based punishment is always forward-looking, seeking to reduce 
the intensity and gravity of crime in society. In other words, utilitarianism takes the 
position that ‘bygones are bygones’ and that future consequences should be the sole 
guide for sanctioning decisions.”). 
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leading contributors.135  But the individual most closely identified with 
the rise of retributivism as the leading theory of punishment is Michael 
Moore,136 and his pure version of the theory is most representative of 
the broad trend toward this non-consequentialist method of reasoning.  
By applying the new psychological findings to this most 
comprehensive and general form of retribution, we will have gone a 
long way toward applying it to all forms of retribution. 
 Moore’s retributivism is not a mixed theory of punishment.  
His definition of the word itself rules out any other value: “By 
‘retributivist’ I refer to one who believes that the justification for 
punishing a criminal is simply that the criminal deserves to be 
punished.”137  The project of a retributivist is to illustrate that our 
intuitions and considered judgments about punishment are captured 
better by the idea that we punish due to moral desert than by the idea 
that we punish to achieve aims such as deterrence, incapacitation, or 
rehabilitation.138 
 The amount of suffering imposed must correspond to the 
offender’s desert: “[R]etributivists at some point have to answer the 
‘how much’ and ‘what type’ questions for punishments of specific 
offences and they are committed to the principle that punishment 
should be graded in proportion to desert . . . .”139  In short, Moore’s 
pure retributivist theory holds that offenders must be punished, that 
they must be punished only because they deserve it, and that the 
amount of punishment must correspond to their level of desert.140 
                                                          
135 For perhaps the most influential early effort, see Herbert Morris, Persons and 
Punishment, supra note 93. 
136 See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW (1997). 
137 Id. at 83. 
138 See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of 
Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 563 (2006) (“Although a retributivist 
will welcome the positive consequences that punishment may incidentally yield — 
for example, crime prevention or character reformation — they are not part of the 
justification for punishment. Thus, a ‘retributivist punishes because, and only 
because, the offender deserves it.’”). 
139 See MOORE, supra note 136, at 88. 
140 See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of 
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1663 (1992) (“[R]etributive justice is concerned 
with wrongful actions from which such harms result.  Although a punishment may 
sometimes involve the wrongdoer compensating her victim in some way, the 
purpose of punishment is not to compensate the person for the harm suffered, but ‘to 
right the wrong.’”). 
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 A necessary precondition to operationalizing that theory is an 
understanding of the manner and degree to which fines and 
imprisonment actually harm those who receive them.  The findings 
discussed in Part II affect pure retributivism in two ways.  First, the 
workings of our adaptive capacities mute the differences between 
large and small fines as well as the differences between long and short 
prison sentences.  And second, adaptation decreases the level of harm 
that an offender sustains from virtually any fine or period of 
incarceration. 
 The first point is simply that if “punishment should be graded 
in proportion to desert,” then in order to deliver the deserved 
punishment, the state needs to be able to adjust the amount of imposed 
harm to fit the severity of the crime.  To do that, it relies on the 
mechanism of increasing or decreasing the amount of a fine or the 
length of a stay in prison.  But as discussed above, such adjustments 
do not do well in tracking adjustments in the amount of harm felt by 
the offender.  Although an offender will expect a larger fine or a 
longer incarceration to decrease her happiness far more severely than a 
smaller fine or a shorter incarceration, her expectation will mistakenly 
ignore her own adaptive skills. 
 Even more so than utilitarianism and expressive theories of 
punishment, which place at least some importance on the amount of 
harm that a given punishment is perceived to impose, pure 
retributivism concerns itself with the amount of harm actually 
imposed.  Its distinctive feature is the principle that to punish criminal 
behavior is inherently right.141  If it is not possible to punish the right 
amount, then it is not possible for justice to be done.  Pure 
retributivism thus requires a rethinking of the types of punishment that 
are currently employed.  Those types create the illusion of a spectrum 
of available harms while in fact offering, more or less, only two.  A 
fine, however large, constitutes only a small diminution of an 
offender’s happiness.  And an incarceration, however brief, constitutes 
a large diminution of such happiness. 
 People adapt so thoroughly to economic losses, and their 
happiness depends so little on their wealth, that fines of varying sizes 
                                                          
141 See MOORE, supra note 136, at 105 (noting “the commitment of retributivism 
. . . to the intrinsic goodness of punishing the guilty”); see e.g., Sigler, supra note 
138, at 563 (“[P]unishment of the deserving is intrinsically good; its justification 
does not depend on any further positive consequences that punishment might be 
expected to produce.”). 
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do not change much the well-being of those on whom they are 
imposed.  Similarly, people adapt surprisingly well to prison, so 
staying in prison longer does not decrease happiness as much as one 
would expect.  This is all the more true because any prison term 
dramatically decreases happiness after prison.  Thus, getting out of 
prison earlier is less valuable than it would appear, both because 
prison itself is less bad than expected (due to adaptation) and because 
the alternative of post-prison life is worse than expected. 
 Let us assume, purely for purposes of illustration, that a fine of 
$100 is the deserved punishment for a certain instance of petty theft, 
and that a prison term of five years is the deserved punishment for a 
certain instance of assault with a deadly weapon.  By “deserved 
punishment,” we mean that those sentences would impose the amount 
of harm deemed morally appropriate in each case by the retributive 
theory.  How would the state deal with crimes whose severity falls in 
between those two?  A larger fine will not impose much more harm 
than the $100 fine, and a shorter prison term will not impose much less 
harm than the five-year term.  And how would a state respond to a 
crime far more severe than the assault with a deadly weapon?  No 
matter how long an incarceration it hands down, that sentence will not 
differ sufficiently from the five-year sentence (in terms of harm 
imposed) to reflect the difference in deserved punishment. 
 This also relates to the second way in which adaptation is 
relevant to retribution.  Whatever punishment is currently thought 
appropriate in response to a given crime will actually inflict less harm 
on the offender than it would absent adaptation.  When a theorist or 
policymaker seeks to connect a crime with an appropriate punishment, 
she must incorporate adaptation into her assessment of how much 
harm the punishment will cause.  Just as would-be offenders will 
wrongly assume that the initial harm of a fine or imprisonment will be 
sustained for a long time, theorists and policymakers are vulnerable to 
making the same incorrect assumption.142  If they do so, then they will 
set punishments that impose less harm than was deemed deserved—
i.e., punishments that do not satisfy the requirements of retribution. 
 This becomes even more clear when considering the way in 
which Moore distinguishes his theory from the mixed theory of 
limiting retributivism (discussed below).  The mixed theory treats 
desert and utility as necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
punishment.  Moore argues that we object to insufficient punishment 
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regardless of utility, pointing to our negative reaction when heinous 
crimes receive slaps on the wrist.143 
 Once again, we can translate Moore’s retributivism into penal 
policy only if we understand how much harm a given punishment 
actually inflicts.  The premise is that to punish someone too little— 
i.e., to inflict too light a harm—is a failure.  If a fine of $1000 is 
thought to inflict a certain amount of harm, but it actually inflicts only 
half that harm due to hedonic adaptation, then we have not achieved 
the retributivist objective.144  Absent an understanding of the powerful 
effects of adaptation, retributivists risk systematic errors in the 
calculus of punishment. 
 
B. Limiting Retributivism 
 
 Both retribution and utilitarianism have a profound influence 
on actual penal policy in the United States, and a prominent mixed 
theory of punishment reflects that reality.  In this theory known as 
limiting retributivism—which has been “adopted by most state 
guidelines systems”145—retributive considerations set an upper and 
lower bound on punishment,146 but within those bounds the sentence is 
determined by utilitarian aims.147  After the bounds have been set by 
the offender’s desert (measured principally by the severity of the 
crime), the specific punishment is chosen “not only [by reference to] 
                                                          
143 See MOORE, supra note 136, at 98-99.  This argument is the opposite of 
limiting retributivism’s parsimony principle (the principle that we should punish no 
more than needed to achieve the desired level of deterrence), because Moore 
maintains that we fail to achieve the true goal of punishment if we punish too little.  
As discussed below, though, limiting retributivism uses desert to set a lower bound 
of punishment and therefore is not entirely insensitive to the demands of the 
retributive theory. 
144 As explained below, the consequences of adaptation for the parsimony 
principle are the other side of the same coin: Adaptation allows us to achieve the 
desired level of deterrence without inflicting as much harm. 
145 Frase, supra note 96.    
146 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 179 (1982) (“‘[A] 
deserved punishment does not mean the infliction on the criminal offender of a pain 
precisely equivalent to that which he has inflicted on his victim; it means rather a 
‘not undeserved punishment which bears a proportional relationship in a hierarchy of 
punishments to the harm for which the criminal has been convicted.’”). 
147 See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-84 (1974); 
Frase, supra note 96; Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 
EMORY L.J. 1059, 1062 & n.8 (1992); see also John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role, 
84 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2008). 
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traditional crime-control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, 
and rehabilitation, but also a concept known as parsimony—a 
preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the 
purposes of the sentence.”148  Among other things, parsimony reflects 
the acknowledgment that punishment is expensive.149  If less 
punishment can achieve the desired end, then society gains monetarily 
by eschewing a more severe alternative (in particular, a longer prison 
sentence). 
 At first blush, it might seem that the effects of adaptation are 
somewhat less problematic for limiting retributivism than for pure 
retributivism.  The mixed theory does not, after all, require that each 
offender receive the precise amount of punishment that corresponds to 
her level of moral desert.  But adaptation is relevant to both parts of 
the mixed theory (setting the bounds and fixing a specific punishment 
within them) for the same reasons that it is relevant, in turn, to both 
pure retributivism and pure utilitarianism. 
 When setting the lower and upper bound of punishment, a 
limiting retributivist looks to the amount of harm that an offender 
deserves to experience.  The harm actually felt at each bound will be 
influenced by the considerations discussed in Part II: because 
offenders adapt to fines and imprisonment, they will experience less 
harm than would otherwise be expected.  This must be taken into 
account when deciding which punishments correspond to the deserved 
bounds of harm.  It also must be considered when deciding how best to 
fulfill utilitarian goals within the prescribed bounds.  As explained in 
Part III, any quantum of punishment may be expected (all else being 
equal) to deter more than its actual harm would warrant because 
adaptation will diminish the actual harm without diminishing the 
expected harm. 
 If we are right that the available degrees of punishment are 
overstated and that, to some considerable extent, only two significant 
levels of punishment exist (any fine or any imprisonment), then those 
two levels could be seen as a very rough way of setting the lower and 
upper bounds prescribed by limiting retributivism.  But large problems 
would still present themselves.  First, would those constitute the 
bounds for every crime?  The theory assumes that the lower and upper 
bounds of acceptable harm will increase with the severity of the crime, 
but this would not be feasible if only two main degrees of harm are 
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available.  Second, it would not be possible to make the adjustments 
within the bounds that are needed to fulfill utilitarian goals—a 
linchpin of the theory.  If there are only two punishments, small and 
large, then there is no way to carry out a theory predicated upon 
making adjustments between two bounds.  Only the bounds 
themselves are available as options.  This denudes the theory of its 
utilitarian element, leaving only the retributivist part remaining. 
Adaptation does, however, make it easier for limiting 
retributivism to achieve one of its principal goals: parsimony.  
Because would-be offenders will overlook their own abilities to adapt, 
less punishment is needed to achieve the deterrent aim, thereby saving 
money and avoiding unnecessary (on this account) suffering.  Just as 
adaptation affects the analysis of utilitarian theories of punishment, it 
affects the analysis of utilitarian elements within mixed theories. 
 
C. Expressive Theories 
 
 Throughout this Part, we have equated punishment with the 
infliction of harm on an offender.  If that is what punishment means, 
then it follows almost by definition that a theory of punishment must 
be sensitive to the connection between a sentence and the harm it 
actually inflicts.  If the goal of a sentence is to inflict the desired (i.e., 
deserved, or optimal) amount of harm, then the state can craft 
appropriate sentences only if it understands the amount of harm they 
will generate. 
 But understanding the connection between punishment and 
harm might be less important for a theory that deemphasizes the 
importance of harm.  Expressive theories of punishment do just that.  
As Dan Kahan wrote in one of the leading early papers challenging the 
retributive/utilitarian dichotomy, “Punishment is not just a way to 
make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies 
moral condemnation.”150  On this view, the important feature of 
punishment is its expression of societal disapproval of the criminal 
act.151  The harm inflicted on the offender is not the focus, either for 
purposes of deterring crime or of meting out that which is deserved. 
                                                          
150 See Kahan, supra note 9; see also, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition 
of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413 (1999). 
151 See Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of Genocide, 99 
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 An initial response that might be provoked by the expressive 
theory is that the theory would presumably rely on harm at least as a 
means of differentiating between the levels of disapproval expressed 
in reaction to different crimes.  If the purpose of punishment is to 
express disapproval, then how does the state express more disapproval 
for murder than for shoplifting?  The most natural answer is to punish 
murder more severely, as defined by inflicting more harm on a 
murderer.  This would suggest that the way in which punishment 
actually causes harm would matter to expressive theories, even if its 
importance were less direct than in the context of retribution or 
utilitarianism. 
 But the story is not so simple.  When the goal is to use 
punishment to express condemnation, what matters might be perceived 
rather than actual harm.  If policymakers, offenders, and the public 
alike believe that greater fines and prison sentences will harm 
criminals more than smaller ones, then the state has at its disposal a 
wide array of punishments with which to express the appropriate level 
of condemnation in each case.  Even if offenders are actually harmed 
very differently from the way in which they are believed to be harmed, 
the level of condemnation is unaffected because it depends upon 
perception rather than reality. 
 We acknowledge that the behavioral insights about punishment 
decline in importance as one focuses less on actual harm to an 
offender and more on society’s (mistaken) perceptions of that harm.  
But even the expressivists do not deny that actual harm has relevance.  
One who places no importance on harm would be willing to hurt an 
offender any amount in order to achieve a desired purpose.  To rule 
out the intentional punishment of the innocent, or the imposition of 
excessive suffering in response to a petty crime, one must care about 
actual harm and not only about perceived harm.152 
 In addition, a punishment system based entirely upon 
perception rather than reality would constantly risk being undermined 
by the truth.  When members of the community see that an offender 
seems perfectly content a short time after paying her fine, might they 
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not eventually come to suspect that the fine constituted a less 
satisfactory expression of disapproval than was originally thought?  
Perhaps the answer is no, because the studies suggest that people do 
not do well at learning about and predicting adaptation, even after 
personal experience.  Nonetheless, if an entire system depends purely 
upon appearance, then presumably the caretakers of that system must 
be sensitive to reality lest it leak out and destabilize the entire 
structure. 
 Most expressivists would likely acknowledge the importance 
of punishment’s true effects rather than arguing that only perception 
matters.  Consider the clever mixed theory advanced by Paul Robinson 
and John Darley in their article The Utility of Desert.153  Robinson and 
Darley argue that punishment can best achieve the aim of encouraging 
compliance with the law if it embodies the community’s desert-based 
standards of justice.  Although this theory in name aims to achieve 
utility by creating a retributive system, it possesses a central hallmark 
of the expressive approach in that its goals depend more on the 
perception of desert-based punishment than on its reality.  If people 
believe that community standards of retribution are being fulfilled, 
then they will be more likely to comply with the law.154 
 Robinson and Darley, however, do not emphasize the 
disconnect between perception and reality but rather focus their 
attention in the opposite direction.  One of the most appealing aspects 
of their theory is that it envisions the law earning its credibility by 
actually doing justice.  The aim is to make people perceive the law as 
just by having it actually be just.155  Among other things, “[t]he 
criminal law must earn a reputation for punishing those who deserve it 
. . . and where punishment is deserved, imposing the amount of 
punishment deserved, no more, no less.”156 
 Imposing the deserved punishment, no more or less, requires of 
course an array of punitive options that inflict varying degrees of harm 
                                                          
153 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453 (1997). 
154 Id. at 497 (“We have argued that a criminal law based on perceived desert 
can enhance the law’s compliance power . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
155 E.g., id. at 477 (“[T]he criminal law can only hope to shape moral thinking    
. . . if it has earned a reputation as an institution whose focus is morally condemnable 
conduct and is seen as giving reliable statements of what is and is not truly 
condemnable. A criminal law that is seen as having a different criterion for 
criminalization—such as criminalization whenever the greater penalties of criminal 
law can provide useful deterrents—is not likely to gain such a reputation.”). 
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to match the varying degrees of desert.  New understandings of 
adaptation indicate that we lack those options, thereby creating an 
obstacle to the successful implementation of expressive theories just as 
much as to that of retributive and utilitarian ones. 
 
D. Other Approaches to Retribution 
 
 In a very recent article, Paul Robinson has catalogued several 
different forms of retributive theory.157  In particular, he describes 
approaches to retribution as falling into three categories: vengeful, 
deontological, and empirical.  The vengeful approach has its roots in 
the lex talionis—an eye for an eye—and sets the amount of deserved 
punishment by reference to the harm suffered by the victim.158  The 
deontological approach focuses not on the harm caused by the crime 
but rather on the blameworthiness of the offender.159  Empirical 
retributivism also emphasizes the offender’s blameworthiness but 
measures it differently:160 whereas deontological retributivism uses 
philosophical principles to arrive at the amount of deserved 
punishment, empirical retributivism uses behavioral studies to learn 
the community’s standards of desert and blameworthiness.161 
 All three forms of retributivism are challenged by the new 
findings about the effect of punishment on happiness.  Vengeful 
retributivism demands that an offender “‘should suffer in the same 
degree as his victim.’”162  To make that happen, the state must assess 
the level of the victim’s suffering and then choose a punishment that 
takes a similar toll on the criminal.  This requires factoring in the 
effect of adaptation on the harm that punishment will cause (as well as 
its effect on the harm the victim suffered).163 
                                                          
157 Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, 
Deontologucal, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 145 (2008), available at 
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 Deontological and empirical retributivism aim to ensure simply 
“that the offender is given . . . that amount of punishment that puts him 
in his proper ordinal rank among all cases of differing degrees of 
blameworthiness.”164  Although they determine blameworthiness (i.e., 
desert) differently, they both require that more punitive harm be 
imposed on more serious offenders.  As in the case of vengeful desert, 
this can be accomplished only by accounting for the effects of 
adaptation on the actual harm created by punishment. 
 One last retributive theory that merits mention is 
“consequentialist retributivism.”165  This is the idea that a state should 
“maximiz[e] the total amount of desert-based punishment.”166  Police 
and prosecutors with limited resources would aim to use those 
resources efficiently, punishing as much as possible where warranted.  
The police would “focus on the per-unit cost of deserved 
punishment,”167 pursuing offenders with the highest ratio of desert168 
to resources necessary for apprehension.  Prosecutors would plea 
bargain extensively to conserve time, making it possible to punish as 
many offenders as much as possible, within the bounds of the 
punishment they deserve.169 
 This approach is an attempt to operationalize retributive 
theory, and as such it relates particularly well to our project of 
identifying factors that determine the way in which theory can be put 
into practice.  As with all retributive theories, it limits punishment to 
that which is deserved.  Imposing harm above that limit in response to 
any particular crime would be out of bounds, and so the theory must 
be supplemented with an account of the way in which punishment 
translates into harm.  Our contribution is to supply that account. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 More serious crimes should receive greater punishment than 
less serious crimes, but the human capacity to adapt frustrates this core 
requirement of any criminal justice system.  A large fine will not 
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165 See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. 
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ultimately diminish an offender’s happiness much more than will a 
small one, nor will a long prison sentence impose much more suffering 
than a short one.  The state thus cannot drastically change the severity 
of a punishment by adjusting the size of a fine or the length of an 
incarceration. 
 By decreasing the prospects for proportional punishment, 
adaptation restricts the penal system’s potential to achieve either 
utilitarian or retributive goals.  Instead of being able to tailor 
punishments so as to increase utility or to reflect desert, the state 
wields a blunt instrument that offers no way to avoid treating 
dissimilar crimes similarly.  
 It might well be possible to find acceptable forms of 
punishment that resist adaptation and enable proportionality in 
sentencing to be achieved.  But the task is not easy, nor the solution 
readily apparent.  For now, all we can offer is the unsettling evidence 
that current forms of punishment do not impose harm in the ways or to 
the degrees that they are assumed to do so.  Neither utilitarian nor 
retributivist theories of punishment can be convincing or complete if 
they fail to account for this fact. 
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